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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
the person who parked the car.10 The defendant contended the ordi-
nance violated his right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
and was a violation of due process. The court upheld the ordinance
stating that it merely created a presumption that the owner was the per-
son who parked the vehicle, and that the burden was placed upon the
owner to offer proof that he was not in possession or control of it.
"This principle does not change the law as to presumption of inno-
cence, but merely shifts [the] burden of going forward with proof,""
the court concluded.
Such a holding has at least two consequences: (1) by implication
it prevents an Oklahoma court from adopting a contrary construction
of a similar ordinance in order to hold a registered owner absolutely
liable; and, therefore, (2) it means that if Oklahoma cities are to exert
such power over car rental companies as was accomplished in Kansas
City, they will need to pass additional ordinances. Even if they do,
it is uncertain that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, given its
strong emphasis on due process in the Cantrell decision, would uphold
such ordinances, despite the trend in the sister state.
Theodore J. Williams, Jr.
DISCOVERY-IN TORT ACTION DEFENDANT'S PERSONAL FINANCIAL
ABILITY TO RESPOND TO THE VERDICT IS NOT DISCOVERABLE.
Sawyer v. Boufford, - N.H. -, 312 A.2d 693 (1974).
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Sawyer v. Boufjord re-
10. OKLAHOMA CrrY, OKLA., ORDINANcES tit. 21, ch. 16, § 10 states in pertinent
part:
Presumption In Reference to Illegal Parking.
(a) In any prosecution charging a violation of any law or regulation govern-
ing the standing or parking of a vehicle, proof that the particular vehicle
described in the complaint was parked in violation of any such law or
regulation, together with the proof that the defendant named in the
complaint was at the time of such parking the registered owner of such
vehicle, shall constitute in evidence a prima facie presumption that the
registered owner of such vehicle was the person who parked or placed
such vehicle at the point where, and for the time during which, such
violation occurred (emphasis added).
The city of Tulsa has passed an identical ordinance: TuLSA, OKLA., REV. ORDINANCES
tit. 37, ch. 3, § 127 (1971).
11, 454 P2. a 680,
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cently ruled that a defendant in a personal injury and wrongful death
action is not required to reveal his personal financial status prior to trial
when "his resources are not, and cannot be an issue in the litigation."'
While the plaintiff in Sawyer was allowed to discover the defendant's
liability insurance coverage, the court was unwilling to extend discovery
to other assets. This decision is significant because it is an indication
of the limitations which states such as New Hampshire are willing to
place on a liberal discovery policy that is designed to promote a fair
settlement out of court.' Though New Hampshire apparently has not
adopted a general discovery statute, the New Hampshire court has rec-
ognized that discovery is based on the relevancy of the information to
the issues and to the promotion of amicable settlements."
Sawyer is not so important to states such as Oklahoma which ap-
ply a relevancy test to determine the limits of discovery and do not rec-
ognize "settlement" as a basis for discovering personal assets, How-
ever, for those states such as New Hampshire that have adopted the
"settlement" theory of rule 26(b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure with regard to liability insurance, Sawyer is a good indication
of the point at which settlement is sacrificed to protect the defendant
from an unwarranted invasion of privacy. While other states have al-
lowed discovery of the limits of liability insurance under the "settle-
ment" theory, 4 it seems likely that discovery of other personal assets
will be denied unless it can be shown that they are relevant or that
exemplary or punitive damages may be awarded.'5
In Sawyer, the plaintiff sought discovery by deposition of the de-
fendant's net worth and the extent of the defendant's assets that might
be reached in addition to the liability insurance. The policy was re-
vealed to have a limit of $25,000. In rejecting the plaintiffs mo-
tion, the court noted that it had in previous cases granted discovery of
federal income tax returns8 and bank accounts, 7 but in all cases, the
1. Sawyer v. Boufford, - N.H. -, 312 A.2d 693 (1974).
2. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Cutter, 108 N.H. 112, 229 A.2d 173
(1967).
3. State v. Cote, 95 N.H. 108, 58 A.2d 749 (1948); Farnum v. Bristol-Myers Co.,
107 N.H. 165, 219 A.2d 277 (1966).
4. Lucas v. District Court, 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 106 (1959); Terry v. Fisher,
12 III. App. 2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1959); Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W.2d 939 (Ky.
App. 1954); Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P.2d 39 (1967).
5. Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 58 Cal. 2d 210, 373 P.2d 457,
23 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1962); Lewis v. Moody, 195 So. 2d 260 (Fla. App. 1967); Gierman
v. Toman, 77 N.H. Super. 18, 185 A.2d 241 (1962); Hennessy v. Pearse, 167 N.Y.S.
792 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
6. Currier v. Company, 101 N.H. 205, 137 A.2d 405 (1957).
7. Calderwood v, Calderwood 112 N.H. 355? 296 A.2d 910 (1972),
[Vol. 10
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information was a material or an essential element to the issues before
the court. Here, disclosure of financial assets was being sought merely
to determine the defendant's ability to pay. The court considered a
recently enacted statute which granted it the power to require dis-
closure of insurance limits when the court felt that discovery would aid
in settlement.8 The Sawyer court noted that the statute conformed to
a previous holding where insurance policies were found to protect the
insured as well as those injured.9 By allowing disclosure, the statute
reduced the risk to the defendant's personal assets and satisfied the
plaintiff's claim before it crowded the docket. However, the court did
not find that the statute or the policy of broad pretrial discovery allowed
an invasion of the defendant's privacy when the merits of the case were
in no way contingent on discovering whether the defendant could pay
the judgment.
Sawyer recalls the split in federal courts over the proper scope of
discovering insurance limits prior to the 1970 amendment to rule 26.
When the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted, one
of the major benefits in providing a liberal discovery procedure based
on relevancy was that it educated "the parties in advance of trial as
to the real value of their claims and defenses, thereby encouraging set-
tlements out of court."'" Federal courts which allowed discovery of
insurance limits prior to the amendment argued that negligence cases
arising out of automobile accidents would inundate the courts and that
the information regarding "liability insurance coverage and its extent
is conducive . . . to just settlements."" Federal courts which did not
allow discovery argued -that the existence or non-existence of liability
insurance had no relevance to the issue of negligence and that rule
26(b) did not provide for such discovery. 12
By specifically providing for discovery of the "existence and con-
tents of any insurance agreement' 3 where the insurer may be liable
for a part or all of the judgment, the 1970 amendment settled the con-
troversy over insurance discovery in federal courts. Only insurance
coverage was specifically included in the amendment and was
[D]istinguished from any other facts concerning defendant's
8. N.H. R1v. STAT. A1NN. § 498:2-a (Supp. 1972).
9. American Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chaput, 95 N.H. 200, 60 A.2d 118 (1948).
10. 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcncE [ 26.02[2] at 26-65 (2d ed. 1972).
11. Cook v. Welty, 253 F. Supp. 875 (D.D.C. 1966).
12. Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F. Supp. 476 (D.NJ. 1962),1;3, FED. P_. CIV, P 26(b)(2),
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financial status (1) because the insurance is an asset created
specifically to satisfy the claim; (2) because the insurance
company ordinarily controls the litigation; (3) because infor-
mation about coverage is available only from defendant or
his insurer; and (4) because disclosure does not involve a
significant invasion of privacy.14
While the amendment terminated the controversy in federal courts, it
was merely influential in state courts. In states such as New Hamp-
shire, the question was resolved by statute. Section 498:2-a appears
to be much more restrictive than rule 26(b)(2) in that section 498:2-a
grant discretion to the court to allow discovery of insurance "only if
the court feels it would assist in the settlement of the case . . .
In New Hampshire, then, discovery of liability insurance is not auto-
matic but must be counterbalanced by "whatever invasion of privacy
is involved."' 6 The Sawyer court found that the desire for settlement
niust give way to the defendant's right of privacy even though the infor-
mation sought might be relevant in settling the case.
Oklahoma has not made a distinction between discovery of liability
insurance and other personal assets and requires that either must be
relevant to the issues of the case. The Oklahoma Supreme Court in
Carman v. Fishel'7 found that the scope of interrogatories did not "in-
lude inquiry concerning whether the defendant had a policy of liability
insurance covering the operation of her automobile at the time of the
accident giving rise to the action ... ."'8 The court premised its re-
fusal to allow discovery of an insurance policy on the issue of relevancy.
The plaintiff had sustained personal injuries arising out of an automo-
bile accident and sought to discover the existence or non-existence of
a liability insurance policy. When the defendant refused to answer the
interrogatory concerning insurance, the trial court sustained the plain-
tiff's motion to compel the defendant to answer. In interpreting the
Oklahoma discovery statutes,'0 the supreme court reversed saying that
*to be relevant the material need not be admissible but it must lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence.20 The court rejected the argu-
ment that discovery might induce a settlement and found that knowl-
14. Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 28 U.S.C.A. § 26(b) (2) at 156 (1972).
15. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 498:2-a (Supp. 1972).
16. 312 A.2d at 695.
17. 418 P.2d 963 (Okla. 1966).
18. Id. at 965.
19. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 548, 549 (1971).
20. Carman v. Fishel, 418 P.2d 963 (Okla, 1966); accord, Westerlheide v, Shilling,
190 Okla. 305 123 P.2d 674 (1942),
[Vol. 10306
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edge of insurance might cause the plaintiff to hold out for a larger, set-
tlement and thus prolong the litigation. It concluded that the argument
for relieving congested court calendars could lead to forcing any infor-
mation out of either side simply to clear the court docket. While there
are circumstances in which knowledge of the insurance policy would
be relevant, such as to show ownership, 21 the Oklahoma statutes were
not intended to allow discovery of insurance in ordinary negligenc6
cases. The supreme court followed a similar view and applied the test
of materiality in the case of Peters v. Webb where the plaintiff sought
discovery of insurance in an action against a doctor for malpractice.
The information was found to be irrelevant to the issues and would not
lead to obtaining evidence. Discovery was therefore denied.22
There are no reported cases in Oklahoma where the issue of dis-
covering the defendant's personal assets other than liability insurance
in a personal injury and wrongful death action has been raised. How-
ever, where the parties have made the financial situation an issue in
the case, it becomes a legitimate subject of inquiry. In Matchen v. Mc-
Gahey,'2 3 the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted discovery of the plain-
tiffs income tax returns because she asked for damages for injuries
which disabled her and restricted her ability to receive income through
employment. The court based its conclusion on title 12, section 548
of the Oklahoma statutes 4 and noted that this "statute § 548, relating
to discovery and production of documents, basically follows Rule 34 of
Title 28, United States Federal Court Rules of Civil Procedure.
3"25 The court found a relationship of the Oklahoma statute to rule
26(b) when it said, "The scope of Rule 34 is within the limits of Rule
26(b) which applies to any matter not privileged which is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action. ... 6
On the basis of this decision, it seems clear that where personal
assets are an issue in the litigation, Oklahoma follows the liberal dic-
tates of rule 26(b) and applies the test of relevancy. However, when
the purpose of discovering insurance liability is only to aid in settlement,
it does not meet the test of relevancy and cannot be discovered. The
confidentiality of insurance information is assured in various Oklahoma
21. Layton v. Cregan & Mallory Co., 263 Mich. 30, 248 N.W. 539 (1933).
22. Peters v. Webb, 316 P.2d 170 (Okla. 1957).
23. Matchen v. McGahey, 455 P.2d (Okla. 1969).
24. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 548 (1971).
25. 455 P.2d at 56.
26, fd,
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